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Search Results 0 to 16 of about 17 (some duplicates have been removed)
in powering afghan communities to defend against taliban intimidation and violence. plans are being developed to increase the authorized size of the alp program from 30,000 to 45,000. the next centcom commander will also play an important role in shaping our enduring partnership with afghanistan after 2014. the partnership that i fully support. ike m. concerned however by the plants to reduce the afghan national security forces by a third starting in 2015. 352,000 to 230,000 by 2017. i believe that any future reductions in the size of the afghan forces should be based on security conditions in afghanistan at that time and this afghan security forces make and providing for their country security, we should reassure them that we will continue to support these efforts by deciding that as we withdraw our forces that there won't get drawdown and afghan forces. progress in afghanistan remains fragile and significant challenges to afghanistan's long-term stability remain. among the greatest threat to its stability are the safe havens for afghan insurgents across the pakistan border. the government o
, the taliban and associated forces in response to the 9/11 attacks and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense. there is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely pilotted aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield at least when the country involved con cents or is unwilling to take action against a threat. second, targeted strikes are ethical. without question, the ability to target a specific individual from hundreds or thousands of miles away raises profound questions. here, i think it is useful to consider such strikes against the basic principle of the law of war that govern the use of force. targeted strikes conform to the principle of necessity. requirement that the target has definite military value. in this armed conflict, individuals who are part of al qaeda or its associated forces are legitimate military targets. we have the authority to target them with lethal force, just as we target enemy leaders in past conflicts such as them and the
% of their population now under afghan control and security. we've been able to diminish the taliban's capabilities. violence has gone down. we're also developing an afghan army that is increased its operational skill to provide security. so we're on the right path towards trying to give afghanistan the opportunity to govern and secure itself. >> general dempsey, very quickly, women in combat. implementing that. is there some movement on capitol hill to pass a law to make sure you don't change standards, somehow lower standards. do you think that's good legislation? >> they can legislate if they like. they don't have to do that, because -- >> you're not going to change your stance? >> we're going to make sure we have the right standards for right job to maintain the readiness of the force. my primary responsibility is the readiness of the force. there's also requirement as we open up occupational specialties to report to congress, and they would have the opportunity to ask us what we've done to standards. look, this really is about changing the paradigm from one of exclusiveness to inclusiveness to
it said local taliban was working with warlords to provide guards and weapons for the use of the contract. it came out that they were failing to adequately investigate the previous employment which resulted in the company's hiring individuals who previously had been fired for sharing sensitive information. security information with the taliban war lords and failure to appropriately some of according to the u.s. intelligence reports may have been involved in anti-american activity. all of that information was out in a classified we several weeks before it to attend comes out of 28 and was out in public of september 28th. guess who the state department gave the contract to for guarding them on the 29th. the eodt and then the were fired for never performing because they couldn't perform accurately. they wanted to litigate. meanwhile guess who is still guarding. we had egis guarding which was another contract of kabul. we still have armored troops then we did a contract with the jet. they finally took over the summer. i urge you all to take a look and you do not have to come secretary, you ca
afghan communities to defend against taliban intimidation and violence. plans are being developed to increase the authorized size of the program from 30,000 down to 45,000. the next commander will also play an important role in shaping our partnership with afghanistan after 2014. a partnership that i fully support. i am concerned however by plans to reduce the afghan national security forces by a third starting in 2015. of retreated 52,000 to two injured 30,000 by 2017. i believe any future reductions in the size of the afghan forces should be based on security conditions in afghanistan at that time and as afghan security forces' progress in providing for their country's security, we should reassure them that we will continue to support these efforts by citing as we withdraw our forces that there won't be a drawdown in afghanistan forces. progress in afghanistan remains fragile, significant challenges to afghanistan's long-term stability remains. among the greatest threat to the stability is the safe havens for the afghan insurgents across the pakistan border which the government
. but the public report came out on september 28. and in that report it said that local taliban was working with war lords to provide guards and weapons for use in the contract. it came out they were failing to adequately investigate the forwards' previous employment which resulted in hiring individuals who had been fired for sharing sensitive information, security information work taliban war lords. failure to appropriately vet guards, some of whom, according to u.s. intelligence reports, may have been involved in anti-american activities. now all of that information was out in the classified way several weeks before september 10, excuse me, september 28, an was out in public september 28.
out secret effort to persuade the taliban to expel bin laden. as we know, bin laden was not expelled. three months later, his wrath was unleashed with an attack on our embassies. did you advise director tenant against this operation? and if so, why? >> i had a conversation with george and that at the time. every single cia manager, george tennant as deputy director of operations at the time, and other individuals at the counter-terrorism center argued against that operation as well because it was not well grounded in intelligence, and its chances of success were minimal. and it was likely that other individuals would be killed. when i was involved in those discussions, i provided the director and others my professional advice about whether i thought that operation should go forward. i also was engaged in discussion with the saudi government at the time. and i encouraged certain action to be taken to put pressure on the taliban as well as bin laden. >> i take it that your answer to my question is that you did advise in favor of the cancellation of that operation. >> based on what i ha
Search Results 0 to 16 of about 17 (some duplicates have been removed)